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RESPONSES
NONLAWYERS AND THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW: AN OVERVIEW




N every state, nonlawyers are generally prohibited from practicing
law, deemed the "unauthorized practice of law" ("UPL"). The def-
inition of what constitutes "the practice of law" or "'the unauthorized
practice of law" is by no means uniform, even within the same juris-
diction. Whatever the definition of UPL, however, the states almost
universally limit the practice of law to those who have been licensed
by the government and admitted to the state's bar association after
meeting certain requirements of education, examination, and moral
character. In addition, the members of the bar are subject to profes-
sional discipline, which is a form of peer review by other members of
the bar, the outcome of which is usually enforced by the state courts.
Particularly in this century, the nexus between required bar admission
and the states' proscription of UPL has created a "'lawyer monopoly"
over a great deal of activity outside of the courts, which are the tradi-
tional domain of lawyering.
As a result, UPL restrictions often prohibit nonlawyers from either
giving out-of-court legal advice or helping prepare legal documents,
except where no accompanying advice is given. This type of prohibi-
tion overwhelmingly affects people of limited means, who are unable
to retain a lawyer based on an inability to pay fees or, in the case of a
pro bono lawyer, based on limited availability of free legal help. This
Article is intended to give a brief overview of the basic legal and ethi-
cal issues involved in the use of nonlawyers to inform further discus-
sion of possible reforms.
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and Anne Marie Bowler, my research assistant, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law
School, for helping me to prepare this Article for publication. Also, I owe a special




I. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE
USE OF NONLAWYERS
A. The Regulation of the Legal Profession
For the last few centuries in America, with some exceptions, the
courts have joined forces with bar associations to regulate lawyers, a
system sometimes referred to as "self-regulation," by: (1) dictating
the processes for admitting lawyers to practice; and (2) disciplining
unprofessional behavior through sanction, suspension, or disbarment.I
Invoking "inherent powers," the highest state courts have claimed
the jurisdiction-sometimes exclusive-to regulate every aspect of the
practice of law, through such activities as specifying conditions for ad-
mission, disciplining or disbarring those lawyers who fail to exercise
good conduct, and promulgating lawyers' codes of conduct.'
Although courts ultimately enforce the regulation of the practice of
law, bar associations have largely set the agenda for its regulation.
The major push to organize bar associations began in the 1870s with
the formation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(1870) and the American Bar Association (1878). The express goal of
these bar groups was to set educational requirements for bar member-
ship. From 1870 to 1920, however, bar associations were instrumental
in lobbying for passage of legislation which prohibited nonlawyers
from making court appearances.
Beginning in the 1920s, bar associations attempted to gain greater
control over the practice of law by spearheading efforts to "integrate"
the bar through court rules (pursuant to inherent powers) or statutes
that required every lawyer to belong to the state bar.3 Mandatory bar
membership made the bar's lawyer discipline and control more effec-
tive. Today, a majority of the states have integrated bar associations.4
1. Stanley S. Arkin, Self-Regulation and Approaches to Maintaining Standards of
Professional Integrity, 30 U. Miami L. Rev. 803, 825 (1976). Lawyers are also con-
trolled by such judicial sanctions as those arising from malpractice lawsuits, contempt
motions, fee awards, and procedural rules prohibiting frivolous practice.
2. See, e.g., Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 529 (1824) (regulating attorneys'
license to practice); see generally Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate
the Practice of Law-A Proposed Delineation, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 783, 784-85 (1976)
(noting that the constitutional creation of a "court" has created incidental powers
necessary to the functioning of those courts).
3. See, e.g., In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265 (Neb. 1937)
(stating that the Supreme Court of Nebraska has the right to integrate the bar pursu-
ant to its inherent powers).
4. See generally Unauthorized Practice Handbook: A Compilation of Statutes,
Cases, and Commentary on the Unauthorized Practice of Law 64-71 (Justine Fischer
& Dorothy H. Lachmann, eds. 1972) [hereinafter Unauthorized Practice Handbook]
(listing UPL statutes concerning associations by state); Standing Comm. on Lawyers'
Responsibility for Client Protection, American Bar Ass'n, 1994 Survey and Related
Materials on the Unauthorized Practice of Law/Nonlawyer Practice (1996) [hereinaf-
ter 1994 Survey on UPL] (surveying each jurisdiction's definition of the practice of
law and overviewing each jurisdiction's activity regarding UPL); see also Eileen Malo-
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ruled that mandatory bar mem-
bership for lawyers does not violate lawyers' constitutional rights.'
B. History of the Regulation of UPL
In the colonial period, courts adopted UPL rules to control those
who appeared before them.6 The courts have used their "inherent
powers" to define UPL and craft remedies for UPL activity.7 Outside
the courtroom, however, nonlawyers were free to engage in a wide
range of activities which would be considered UPL today, such as giv-
ing legal advice and preparing legal documents.' Subsequently, the
first hundred years of the American republic marked a liberalization
of UPL rules, whereby many legislatures passed measures permitting
nonlawyers to appear before the courts.9 As discussed in greater de-
tail below, this era of nonlawyer practice ended shortly after the Civil
War with the rise of bar associations and the corresponding growth of
lawyer professionalism. Nonetheless, even the first ABA Canons of
Ethics adopted in 1908 said nothing about UPL.
Professional bar associations began seeking integration, they also
began to organize against UPL. In 1914, the New York County Law-
yers Association launched the first unauthorized practice campaign by
forming an unauthorized practice committee to curtail competition
ney, Bar Association Dues, Nat'l L.J., July 14, 1980, at 25, 26 (listing the 33 states and
the District of Columbia that have integrated bars).
5. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222
(1967) (stating that whether "the States have broad power to regulate the practice of
law is, of course, beyond question."); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961)
(noting that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had the constitutional right to require
the costs of improving the legal profession be borne by lawyers).
6. Certain colonies sought to prevent the establishment of a professional lawyer
monopoly by permitting nonlawyers to appear before the courts and prohibiting the
charging of fees for these services. See Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics 19 (1953). In
the nineteenth century, certain states continued to permit nonlawyers to represent
parties in litigation, sometimes by statute. See id. Among these states permitting
nonlawyers to advocate in their courts were Indiana, Michigan, New Hampshire,
Maine, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts. See id.; see also Erwin N. Griswold, Law and
Lawyers in the United States: The Common Law Under Stress 15-16 (1964) (describ-
ing a Massachusetts act that allowed nonlawyers to appear before the court on behalf
of others until 1930 when authorized by a power of attorney).
7. See State v. Cline, 555 P.2d 724, 731 (Mont. 1976) (citing other high court
authority in support of courts' inherent powers to define UPL); see also Comment,
Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of the Inherent Judicial Power, 28
U. Chi. L. Rev. 162, 162-63 (1960) (arguing that the reach of some state courts' inher-
ent judicial powers had exceeded their constitutional limits).
8. See James W. Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers 319(1950). In contrast to the United States, European countries today still permit
nonlawyers to perform such tasks outside the courtroom. See Michael Zander, Legal
Services for the Community 329 (1978).
9. See Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good




from title and trust companies. 1° By 1930, the American Bar Associa-
tion ("ABA") had formed its own committee on unauthorized prac-
tice and began publishing Unauthorized Practice News a few years
later." The Canons of Professional Ethics were amended in 1937 to
include a strong attack on UPL.l2 Bar associations initiated lawsuits
seeking injunctions against individuals and entities purported to be
performing UPL. 13 State courts invoked their inherent powers to reg-
ulate the practice of law based on "common-law doctrines of exclusive
lawyer competence," even upon matters not directly before a particu-
lar tribunal.14
After many court victories for the organized bar in the 1930s and
pursuant to a resolution of the ABA House of delegates in 1940, ABA
committees began to negotiate "statements of principles" with other
professionals and businesses seeking to limit competition with lawyers
by proscribing certain conduct as UPL.15 Subsequently, these "state-
ments of principles" were seriously undermined by the Supreme
Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,16 which applied an-
titrust laws to a bar association for setting minimum prices upon cer-
tain legal tasks. In the wake of Goldfarb, the United States Justice
Department filed suit against another bar association for antitrust vio-
lations arising from the enforcement of one of these "Statements of
Principles." Shortly thereafter, the ABA's board of governors advised
that all "Statements of Principles" should be rescinded, 7 and seven
10. See Hurst, supra note 8, at 323.
11. See ABA, Report of the 53rd Annual Meeting, 55 A.B.A. Rep. 94 (1930).
12. See ABA Canons of Prof. Ethics Canon 47 (1937) ("No lawyer shall paermit
his professional services, or his name, to be used in aid of, or to make possible, the
[UPL] by any lay agency, personal or corporate.").
13. See Christensen, supra note 9, at 181-85.
14. Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 825 (practicioner's ed. 1986); see
also Commission on Nonlawyer Practice, American Bar Ass'n, Nonlawyer Activity in
Law-Related Situations 17 n.46 (1995) [hereinafter Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Re-
lated Situations] (noting that "[a]n early exception to [UPLI were nonprofit corpora-
tions such as the New York Legal Aid Society ... so long as fees were not charged
and lawyers were free to exercise their independent judgment on behalf of clients").
In general, courts find not-for-profit corporations exempt from UPL prohibitions. See,
e.g., In re Education Law Ctr., Inc., 429 A.2d 1051, 1058 (N.J. 1981) (finding that such
entities may employ non-lawyers to formulate broad policies). The interplay between
UPL rules and rules prohibiting nonlawyer partners or control are discussed in the
paper presented at this conference by Wayne Moore, Are Organizations that Provide
Free Legal Services Engaged in the Unauthorized Practice of Law?, 67 Fordham L.
Rev. 2397 (1999).
15. See Christensen, supra note 9, at 195-96. For instance, from 1941 to 1969, the
ABA successfully entered into "statements of principles" with the following entities:
accountants, architects, banks with trust departments, claims adjusters, collection
agencies, liability insurance companies, life insurance companies, professional engi-
neers, law book publishers, real estate title companies, realtors, and social workers.
See Wolfram, supra note 14, at 826.
16. 421 U.S. 773 (1975)
17. See James Podgers, Statements of Principles: Are They on the Way Out, 66
A.B.A. J. 129 (1980).
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states and the ABA disbanded their Unauthorized Practice
committees.'
In general, UPL prosecutions have declined over the last thirty
years for a variety of reasons.' 9 A 1992 ABA survey found, however,
that twenty-two state bars still retain "active" UPL committees, and
eleven of these UPL committees began activity after 1981.20 Recently,
there has been a somewhat justified perception that nonlawyer prac-
tice is a "rising tide,' 'z2 and, as a result, there has been a limited "revi-
val of UPL enforcement efforts by bar associations."2
Therefore, while Goldfarb and other concurrent factors may have
ushered in a slightly more level playing field in the delivery of legal
services, we are still left to grapple with the vast bulk of statutes, legal
precedents and ethical rules that arose from the ABA's half-century
campaign against UPL. These anti-UPL sources of law and regula-
tion-arising from a desire to eliminate competition rather than pro-
tect the public interest-greatly enlarged the areas of practice that
now must be performed exclusively by lawyers. These expanded areas
of practice have created an expectation among lawyers-no matter
how unjustified-and a tradition in practice as to the tasks that only
lawyers should perform.
C. Regulating Unauthorized Practice Today
In most states, high courts have claimed that the courts have the
authority to define and regulate UPL and the practice of law. In addi-
tion, almost all states' legislatures have effected statutes that prohibit
UPL, sometimes making UPL a criminal misdemeanor.' In addition,
18. See Manual, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 21:8005 (1984);
Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empir-
ical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L Rev. 1, 14-15 (1981).
19. Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Related Situations, supra note 14, at 24. The ABA
attributes the decline in UPL enforcement to several factors, which are as follows: (1)
widespread use of work-reducing technology, such as the typewriter and computer,
which allowed lawyers to hire nonlawyers for ministerial tasks formerly performed by
lawyers or clerks "reading the law"; (2) relaxing UPL rules in the 1960s to permit the
use of paralegal or legal assistants to perform what was formerly considered "lawyer's
work"; (3) explosive growth in the number of administrative proceedings before state
and federal agencies in which nonlawyers were permitted to represent others; (4) high
cost to the bar of prosecuting numerous UPL cases; (5) states' attorneys general and
prosecutors giving low priority to UPL cases; (6) state courts' reluctance to find UPL
except in the case of actual harm to the clients or public; (7) U.S. Supreme Court case
law carving out constitutionally-protected exceptions to UPL prohibitions; and (8)
negative public reaction to UPL restrictions. See id. at 23-32.
20. See American Bar Ass'n, State Legislative Clearinghouse Briefing Book: Un-
authorized Practice of Law tab D (1992).
21. See Sherri Kimmel, Stemming the Tide of Unauthorized Practice, 13 Me. BJ.
164, 164 (1998); James Podgers, Legal Profession Faces Rising Tide of Non-Lawyer
Practice, Ariz. Att'y, Mar. 1994, at 24.
22. Podgers, supra note 21, at 56.
23. Some states' courts have struck down legislative attempts to modify UPL rules
as unconstitutional usurpations of judicial power. See, e.g., Merco Constr. Eng'rs, Inc.
1999] 2585
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the organized bar has prohibited its members from aiding UPL
through its disciplinary actions to enforce ethical rules.
1. Defining UPL24
a. Professional Responsibility
The ethical rules that regulate a lawyer's professional responsibility
provide only a loose framework for understanding UPL. Neither the
1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model
Code"), nor the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules") define UPL. However, Model Rule ("MR") 5.5(b)
prohibits lawyers from "assist[ing] a person who is not a member of
the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes [UPL]. ''2 5 Simi-
larly, the Model Code's Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 3-101(A) pros-
cribes against "aid[ing] a non-lawyer in [UPL]' '2 6 while Canon 3
affirmatively states that "A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing
[UPL]."27
The Comment to MR 5.5(b) explains: "The definition of the prac-
tice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to
another. '28  In addition, the Model Code's Ethical Consideration
("EC") 3-5, meant to explicate Canon 3 and DR 3-101(A), instructs
that "[i]t is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt the formulation
of... what constitutes the practice of law."'29 In support of this propo-
sition, EC 3-5 states: "What constitutes [UPL] in a particular jurisdic-
tion is a matter for determination by the courts of that jurisdiction. 30
Nonetheless, EC 3-5 does take a stab at a "functional" definition:
[T]he practice of law relates to the rendition of services for others
that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. The essence of
the professional judgment of the lawyer is his educated ability to
v. Municipal Court, 581 P.2d 636, 638 (Cal. 1978) (holding that "legislative enactments
relating to admission to practice law are valid only to the extent they do not conflict
with rules ... adopted . . . by the judiciary"). Other states' courts have endorsed
statutes regulating UPL out of comity for a coordinate branch of government. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Frieson v. Isner, 285 S.E.2d 641, 654 (W. Va. 1981) (considering the
intrusion upon the judiciary "minimal" and "inoffensive").
24. See generally Center for Prof'l Responsibility, American Bar Ass'n,
Definitions of Practice of Law: 1984 Survey on Unauthorized Practice of Law
Regulation (1985) (conducting a survey of numerous jurisdictions as to the definition
of the practice of law); 1994 Survey on UPL, supra note 4 (summarizing the way in
which different jurisdictions define the practice of law); Alan Morrison, Defining the
Unauthorized Practice of Law: Some New Ways of Looking at an Old Question, 4
Nova L. Rev. 363 (1980) (discussing what constitutes UPL).
25. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5(b) (1998).
26. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 3-101(A) (1981).
27. Id. Canon 3.
28. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5(b); id. cmt. 5.3.
29. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 3-5.
30. Id. EC 3-5 n.2.
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relate the general body and philosophy of law to a specific legal
problem of a client.
31
EC 3-5 carves out some exceptions to the "professional judgment of a
lawyer" rule for "occupations that require a special knowledge of law
in certain areas," such as police officers, court clerks and many gov-
ernmental employees.32
Under the same aegis as UPL, the Model Code and the Model
Rules both seek to protect the independence of the "professional
judgment of a lawyer" in the following general ways: prohibiting law-
yers from forming partnerships with a nonlawyer to practice la; 33
and proscribing the sharing fees with a nonlawyer, except where the
nonlawyer distributees of a lawyer's estate are to receive a portion of
a fee in the event of his or her death or where nonlawyer employees
participate in a retirement plan based on profit-sharing.' In addition,
both the Model Code and the Model Rules recognize certain excep-
tions to UPL restrictions. For instance, a lavyer may hire nonlawyer
assistants "so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and
retains responsibility for their work.' '35 Furthermore, the Comment to
MR 5.5 states that the UPL rule "does not prohibit lawyers from pro-
viding professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose em-
ployment requires knowledge of law... [and] nonlawyers who wish to
proceed pro se. ' 36
b. Statutes
All states have statutes that restrict the practice of law to licensed
attorneys. 37 Because these statutes are often vaguely worded, how-
ever, they fail to define UPL succinctly. One common type of UPL
statute is the so-called "integration act," which limits the practice of
law to members of an integrated bar association.31 In addition, two-
thirds of the states have made UPL a criminal misdemeanor.39
31. Id EC 3-5.
32. d EC 3-5.
33. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 3-103; Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct Rule 5.4(b).
34. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 3-102: Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct 5.4(a).
35. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 5.3 & cmt., 5.5; see also Model
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(D), DR 7-107(J) (requiring lawyers to
use reasonable care in preventing their employees from revealing confidences of a
client or making statements prohibited under DR 7-107).
36. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5 & cmt.
37. See generally 1994 Survey on UPL, supra note 4, at 55-248 (analyzing statutory
provisions in all fifty states).
38. "Integrated" in this context means exclusive or complete, as in an -integrated
contract."
39. [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 21:8008 (1984) ("Given
the scarcity of conclusive definitions of the practice of law, such [misdemeanor] prose-
cutions could be challenged on grounds of [constitutionally invalid] vagueness.").
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UPL statutes usually proscribe three broad categories of activity:
(1) representing another in a judicial or administrative proceeding; (2)
preparing legal instruments or documents which affect the legal rights
of another; and (3) advising another of their legal rights and responsi-
bilities.4" Some statutes name specific individuals and organizations
which are not permitted to practice law, such as title insurance compa-
nies and corporations.41 Exceptions to UPL statutes always include
self-representation and sometimes include lay representation before
certain local courts or state administrative agencies.4"
c. Case Law
Court decisions on UPL, like UPL statutes, do not announce a sin-
gle clear definition of the practice of law but have proceeded on a
case-by-case basis,43 which makes for wide variation between different
states.44 The case law, however, has arrived at certain methods for
defining the practice of law and, by extension, what constitutes UPL,
which may be summarized as follows:
(1) Professional Judgement of a Lawyer-activity requiring legal
skills or special knowledge beyond that of the average nonlawyer;45
(2) Traditional Areas of Law Practice-activity traditionally per-
formed by lawyers;46
(3) Personal Relationship-activity characterized by the special
personal relationship between lawyer and client;47
40. [Manual] Laws. Man on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 21:8004 (1984).
41. For sources containing discussion of UPL statutes, see supra note 4 and ac-
companying text.
42. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing UPL statutes).
43. See, e.g., In re Unauthorized Practice Rules Proposed by the South Carolina
Bar, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124 (S.C. 1992) ("[I]t is neither practicable nor wise to attempt a
comprehensive definition [of the practice of law] by way of a set of rules... [but] the
better course is to decide what is and what is not the unauthorized practice of law in
the context of an actual case or controversy.").
44. See [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 21:8004-05 (1984).
45. See, e.g., Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 469 P.2d 353, 358 (Cal. 1970) (uphold-
ing regulations prohibiting laymen from engaging in UPL); Agran v. Shapiro, 273
P.2d 619, 626-28 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1954) (holding accountant engaged in
UPL when discussing client's tax liability with taxing authorities). But see Zelkin v.
Caruso Discount Corp., 9 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (holding that an
accountant did not engage in UPL when discussing settlement of his client's tax liabil-
ity because he did not read or cite any case law to taxing authority).
46. See, e.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 15 (Ariz.
1961) (prohibiting realtors from giving legal advice concerning real estate
transactions).




(4) Incidental Legal Services-activity frequently performed by
nonlawyers as an incident to another business transaction4 8 as long as
"difficult or doubtful legal questions are [not] involved": 9
(5) Actual Harm-activity performed by nonlawyers that results in
actual harm to the client or public;5
(6) Standard of Care-activity performed by nonlawyers held to
the same standard of care as lawyers;5 1 and
(7) Balance of Interests-activity is weighed as to the interests of
consumers in reduced costs and increased convenience and the inter-
ests of other licensed vocations to use their expertise. 2
Furthermore, the statutes and case law have jointly identified cer-
tain areas of activity that are most likely to be characterized as UPL:
(1) Court Appearances-Almost every American court has prohib-
ited nonlawyers from appearing before them,53 except in certain lower
courts where nonlawyers may represent another person by court rule
or statute;
54
(2) Administrative Agencies-Federal administrative agencies may
permit nonlawyers to appear before them based on their internal
rules, but nonlawyer practice among state agencies varies by jurisdic-
tion, according to statutory authorization and sometimes the permis-
sion of the state's high court;55
48. See, e.g., In re Bercu, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209, 221 (App. Div. 1948) (holding that a
qualified lawyer must be sought by a taxpayer when a tax question is so difficult that it
goes beyond the duties of a regular accountant), aff d men., 87 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y.
1949); Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc., 694 P.2d 630, 633 (Wash. 1985) (en-
dorsing the right of the public to benefit from incidental legal services performed by
nonlawyers).
49. State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., Inc., 575 P.2d 943, 948 (N.M.
1978).
50. See iL at 949 (holding that nonlawyers who filled in forms drafted by a lawyer
were not engaged in UPL because there was no "great loss, detriment or inconven-
ience to the public").
51. See, e.g., Cultwn, 694 P.2d at 633 (allowing nonlawyers to prepare legal forms
as long as they "compl[ied] with the standard of care demanded of an attorney");
Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (holding non-lawyers liable even to
those not in privity for negligent UPL).
52. See, e.g., Cultwn, 694 P.2d at 633-34 (examining the benefits of allowing non-
lawyers to perform certain legal tasks).
53. See Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513-14 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Stokes v.
Village of Wurtsboro, 474 N.Y.S.2d 660, 661 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding that the power
of attorney does not a give nonlawyer power to represent another in lawsuit).
54. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 9-1607.1 (1995) (stating that nonlawyer
advocates are permitted in administrative hearings); Oregon State Bar v. Wright, 573
P.2d 283, 288-89 (Or. 1977) (holding that an Oregon statute permits a nonlawyer to
represent another in justice or peace courts).
55. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
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(3) Legal Advice-Courts sometimes deem nonlawyers who give
advice as to the legal consequences of a matter to be engaged in
UPL;
56
(4) Corporations-Most states have statutes or case law aimed at
preventing corporations from practicing law,57 which are supported by
the Codes and Rules of Professional Responsibility;58
(5) Real Estate Transfers-While some states hold that a nonlaw-
yer may not prepare or fill out any documents for a real estate trans-
fer,5 9 the majority of jurisdictions permit this practice, but only where
no charge for the service is made; 60
(6) Insurance Adjusters-In general, courts have not permitted ad-
justers to represent clients in filing claims against insurers, even where
authorized by statute; 6' and
(7) Collection Agencies-Most state courts have permitted collec-
tors to contact debtors and negotiate payment, but additional steps
beyond that are often considered UPL.62
State courts have assumed varying amounts of control over the reg-
ulation of the practice of law. For instance, some state courts have
announced their exclusive jurisdiction over regulating the practice of
law as an extension of the separation of powers doctrine inherent in
56. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Larkin, 298 So. 2d 371, 373 (Fla. 1974) (barring a re-
tired lawyer from giving advice on wills for a fee); People v. Life Science Church, 450
N.Y.S.2d 664, 673-74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (finding that a church engaged in the unau-
thorized practice of law by giving tax advice to prospective ministers), appeal dis-
missed, 461 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (App. Div. 1983). The prohibition on advice has been
extended by some states to preclude giving personalized instructions on how to use
do-it-yourself legal kits. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. of Bar v. Dacey, 222 A.2d 339,
347 (Conn. 1966) (deeming defendant's informational booklet to be outside the per-
missible "general information" category), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 683 (1967).
57. See Christensen, supra note 9, at 181-85.
58. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4(d) (1998); see also Model
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 3-103 (1981) (forbidding lawyers from form-
ing partnerships with non-lawyers where any partnership activities consist of the prac-
tice of law).
59. See, e.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 14-15 (Ariz.
1961) (listing instances where a non-lawyer would be considered to be engaging in the
unauthoized practice of law).
60. See, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 771, 774 (Ill.
1966) (distinguishing between ordinary broker work which may seem "legal" but is
nevertheless permissible, and more particularized work in which it is impermissible
for anyone other than a lawyer to engage).
61. See, e.g., Gross v. Reliance Ins. Co., 462 N.Y.S.2d 776, 778 (Sup. Ct. 1983)
(holding that an insurance adjuster is not generally authorized to act on behalf of an
insured in claims for losses).
62. See State ex rel. Porter v. Alabama Ass'n of Credit Executives, 338 So. 2d 812,
814 (Ala. 1976) (ruling that a collection agency's threat to file suit is UPL); State ex
rel. Freebourn v. Merchants' Credit Serv., 66 P.2d 337, 341-43 (Mont. 1937) (holding
that a collection agency which hired lawyers as employees to take legal action had
committed UPL); State ex rel. State Bar v. Bonded Collections, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 250,
257-58 (Wis. 1967) (finding that a collection agency which had hired a lawyer and
directed the lawyer to sue was engaged in UPL).
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the state's tricameral system of government. The effect of this exclu-
sive domain and control over the practice of law has meant that some
state courts have invalidated legislative 63 or executive 6 action that
permitted a relaxation of prohibitions on UPL.
Courts in other jurisdictions have ruled that their inherent powers
to regulate the practice of law are concurrent with the power of the
co-equal branches of government to regulate the practice of law.' In
addition, each state court's inherent powers are subject to the federal
preemption. Thus, where a federal administrative agency permits a
nonlawyer to appear before its hearing officers, the states are without
power to prohibit this practice as UPL.66
Based on the case law, certain exceptions to UPL restrictions have
taken shape which are widely recognized by the states and may be
summarized as follows:
(1) Self-Representation is a constitutional right;"7
(2) Publishers have a First Amendment right to create and sell do-
it-yourself legal kits, so long as there is no personal contact between
the seller and customers involving how to use the kits;'
(3) Document Preparers, or scriveners, are permitted to help
others with filling out forms, so long as no advice is given;69
63. See Bennion v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730, 735-36 (Wash. 1981) (invali-
dating a statute that authorized nonlawyers involved in transfers of real property to
draft and complete documents incident to the transaction because the legislature en-
croached on the court's inherent authority to regulate the practice of law).
64. See West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 109 S.E.2d 420,432 (W. Va. 1959) (strik-
ing down a state administrative agency rule permitting nonlawyers to appear before
the state worker's compensation board).
65. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 418 (Fla. 1980) (upholding a
Florida statute that permitted nonlawyers to represent others before the state
worker's compensation board).
66. See Sperry v. Florida ex reL Florida Bar. 373 U.S. 379, 388 (1963).
67. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975); Model Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 3-7 (1981).
68. See In re Thompson, 574 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Mo. 1978); New York County Law-
yers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459, 459 (N.Y. 1967); Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist,
538 P.2d 913, 919 (Or. 1975). See generally Patricia J. Lankin, Annotation, Sale of
Books or Forms Designed to Enable Laymen to Achieve Legal Results Without Assist-
ance of Attorney as Unauthorized Practice of Law, 71 A.LR.3d 1000, 1006-07 (1976)
(discussing the "[v]iew that sale of 'kits,' absent a personal attorney-client relation-
ship, does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law"). These materials have
become more and more accessible, especially with the advent of the personal com-
puter. An innovator in this area is NOLO Press, but now even Microsoft Word (as
well as other popular word processing programs) comes equipped with "templates"
for legal forms.
69. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978) (holding
that it was proper for the defendant to advertise and engage in secretarial services
provided that no legal advice was given); State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1, 8-9




(4) Law student practice is permitted with certain qualifications;7"
(5) Nonlawyer representation is permitted in certain administrative
proceedings;71
(6) Nonlawyer participation is protected in the exercise of federal
and constitutional rights.72
For at least the last one hundred years, courts and legislatures have
been attempting to define the practice of law and its inverse, UPL.
However, lawyers and nonlawyers alike attempting to forge new
ground are forced to rely on a vague assortment of defined areas that
do not cohere in a uniform whole.
D. Enforcement of UPL Laws
Bar associations and prosecutors may seek the following remedies
against nonlawyers found in violation of UPL laws: (1) injunction; (2)
criminal prosecution; (3) criminal contempt; and (4) quo warranto
writs. Injunctions are the most common method employed to curtail
UPL. Formally, these injunctive actions should be brought by the
state's attorney general in order to protect the public interest. 73 Most
states, however, have granted the integrated bar standing to enjoin
UPL.74 Criminal prosecutions against UPL are rare. 5
Contempt may be sought in two forms: direct and indirect. 76 A
litigant may move for direct contempt against a nonlawyer appearing
in a court proceeding for a client or an interested party may initiate an
action for indirect contempt for UPL occurring outside the court-
70. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 594 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Cal. 1979) (denying the defendant's
claim that he had inadequate legal representation notwithstanding the fact that one
member representing him was not yet a member of the bar). States differ with respect
the rules adopted by the bar and the courts for law student practice. See Fannie J.
Klein et al., Bar Admission Rules and Student Practice Rules 913-1225 (1978).
71. See Sperry, 373 U.S. at 399-400 (noting that the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. 35555(b) (1994), authorizes each agency to permit nonlawyer participation in
its proceedings); Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 416-18 (Fla. 1980).
72. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1969) (holding that without a rea-
sonable alternative it was not UPL when nonlawyer inmate helped another in prepar-
ing post-conviction litigation); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963)
(holding that nonlawyer solicitation for litigation is protected by the First Amend-
ment freedom of association in keeping with one's political beliefs). For a more thor-
ough discussion of this aspect of UPL, see Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal
Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2241 (1999).
73. In 1960, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State laws
promulgated a Model Act Providing Remedies for the Unauthorized Practice of Law,
permitting only injunctive relief for UPL sought by the attorney general who could
delegate his authority to the bar.
74. See Note, Remedies Available to Combat the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 62
Colum. L. Rev. 501, 506-08 (1962) [hereinafter Remedies Available to Combat UPL].
Attorney class actions have also been permitted. See id. at 508-12. Only South Caro-
lina denies the bar the right to bring such injunctive suits against UPL activity. See
Rhode, supra note 18, at 12.
75. See [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 21:8008 (1984).
76. See Remedies Available to Combat UPL, supra note 74, at 512-15.
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room. In addition, contempt may be imposed against a nonlawyer
who fails to comply with an injunction forbidding the UPL activity.
Contempt may result in fines or sometimes imprisonment or both.'
Finally, the least common UPL enforcement is undertaken through
writs quo warranto. Writs quo warranto are usually brought by a
state's attorney general (or others where the attorney general refuses
to act) to restrain a corporation from engaging in conduct beyond the
scope of its charter, including unlawful activity such as UPL.7 s
E. Rationale Behind UPL Doctrine
The rationale invoked by courts to prohibit UPL is reflected in ethi-
cal considerations ("ECs") of the Model Code.79 EC 3-1 of the Model
Code explains that "[tihe prohibition against the practice of law by a
layman is grounded in the need of the public for integrity and compe-
tence of those who undertake to render legal services."'  EC 3-2 spec-
ifies that "[t]he sensitive variations in the considerations that bear on
the legal determinations often make it... essential that the personal
nature of the relationship of client and lawyer be preserved." ' EC 3-
2 also defines "[c]ompetent professional judgment" as "the product of
a trained familiarity with law and legal processes, a disciplined, analyt-
ical approach to legal problems, and a firm ethical commitment."'
By contrast, EC 3-3 cautions that a nonlawyer "is not governed as
to integrity or legal competence by the same rules that govern the
conduct of a lawyer."83 Furthermore, EC 3-3 states that "[t]he public
interest is best served in legal matters by a regulated profession com-
mitted to such standards," such as the Disciplinary Rules which pro-
tect the public from breached confidences, improper solicitation,
divided loyalties, and lack of independent exercise of judgment. 4
Also, EC 3-3 cites the attorney-client privilege as another benefit to
the public.
Finally, EC 3-4 describes the vulnerabilities of potential clients of
legal services who are "not in a position to judge whether he or she
will receive proper professional attention" for a legal matter concern-
ing "the confidences, the reputation, the property, the freedom, or
even the life of the client."85 Thus, EC 3-4 finds that "[p]roper protec-
tion of members of the public" requires that lawyers be "subject to the
regulations of the legal profession."86
77. See id. at 512-14.
78. See id. at 516-18.
79. See Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Related Situations, supra note 14, at 18.
80. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 3-1 (1981).
81. Id. EC 3-2.
82. Id. EC 3-2.
83. Id. EC 3-3.
84. Id. EC 3-3.
85. Id. EC 3-4.
86. Id. EC 3-4.
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In brief, these ECs reflect the dominant justifications for prohibit-
ing UPL and restricting the practice of law to members of the bar:
(1) protecting the public against harmful incompetence and unscru-
pulous conduct;87
(2) protecting the administration of justice from incompetent or
unscrupulous nonlawyers; 8
8
(3) supplying a system of discipline to regulate lawyers;89 and
(4) rewarding lawyers with an economic advantage over their po-
tential and actual competitors in exchange for their submitting to
regulation.90
1. Client Protection
The notion that permitting nonlawyers to practice law would harm
clients rests on two basic assumptions: (1) under UPL rules, lawyers
are more likely to protect client interests than nonlawyers would with-
out UPL rules; and (2) clients would be worse off without UPL
rules.91 The first assumption is backed by the belief that lawyers are
both more competent and more scrupulous than nonlawyers would be
in handling legal matters. These assumptions are erroneous. First,
while lawyers do have special knowledge, they may not be any more
competent than a nonlawyer specialist in performing certain specific
tasks. For instance, from this author's own experience, nonlawyer ad-
vocates who advise tenants on a daily basis about how to trek through
the thicket of New York City's housing court often help train lawyers
who are volunteering their services to poor tenants pro bono.
Second, lawyers have no exclusive claim to integrity despite the op-
eration of disciplinary rules which ostensibly enforce good behavior.
Studies of the lawyer discipline system suggest that lawyers rarely suf-
fer any consequences for incompetence or other failings. 2 Accord-
ingly, Professor Charles Wolfram has opined that if nonlawyers were
87. See Elliot E. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of
the Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA. L. Rev. 438, 439 (1965)
("The condemnation of the unauthorized practice of law is designed to protect the
public from legal services by persons unskilled in the law. The prohibition of lay
intermediaries is intended to insure the loyalty of the lawyer to the client unimpaired
by intervening and possibly conflicting interests.").
88. [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 21:8004 (1984); Nonlaw-
yer Activity in Law-Related Situations, supra note 14, at 126; Wolfram, supra note 14,
§ 15.1.2, at 828-29.
89. See Wolfram, supra note 14, § 15.1.2, at 828-29.
90. See id.; Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsi-
bility, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 702, 712 (1977); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of
Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 Cal. L.
Rev. 487 (1965) (examining the judiciary's treatment of occupational licensing).
91. See Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Related Situations, supra note 14, at 126; Wolf-
ram, supra note 14, § 15.1.2, at 829.
92. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 18, at 16-17 (examining state bar organizations
and their unauthorized practice committees).
[Vol. 672594
NONLAWYERS AND UPL
permitted to practice law, then "[t]he law of malpractice, contract and
fiduciary limits on fee charges, and agency rules requiring loyalty to a
principal would probably protect clients almost as well [as the lawyer
discipline system]."'93 In addition, many other professions-often
those historically accused of UPL, such as realtors, stockbrokers, and
accountants-must pass certification tests for competence and are
subject to discipline for incompetent or unethical behavior. Finally,
there is a growing movement in the business community for corpora-
tions to adopt and adhere to a code of business ethics.94 By contrast,
recent commentaries by prominent lawyers bemoan the decline of
"professionalism" among lawyers and seek its revival.95
The second assumption that clients are better off under a system of
UPL rules is based on the paternalistic belief that the public needs the
protection which the UPL system provides.96 The argument in favor
of UPL rules "assumes that clients cannot be trusted to choose for
themselves whether they want to pay for the extra protection of a
generalist instead of the narrower protection of a nonlawyer special-
ist."97 In addition, even "clients who are aware of the limitations on
the abilities and ethics of nonlawyers might rationally want to hire
them despite their shortcomings because, in a free competitive market
for legal services, those shortcomings will bring lower prices."98 Vari-
ous ABA studies of the civil legal needs of the public have found that
a significant portion of the legal needs of low and moderate income
households are not addressed by any part of the justice system.99 The
cost of a lawyer's services is a common factor cited for not seeking a
lawyer's services."°  Furthermore, many tasks that lawyers now per-
form exclusively could be competently performed by nonlawyers be-
cause these tasks do not necessarily require a lawyer's professional
93. Wolfram, supra note 14, § 15.1.2, at 831.
94. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalisn Paradignz Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1229, 1266 (1995).
95. See id. at 1230; see also Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. Pa. L Rev.
659 (1990) (examining forms of deception used by attorneys in dealing with their
clients).
96. See Wolfram, supra note 14, § 15.1.2, at 832 ("Nonlawyers are hardly ever con-
sulted about the wisdom of particular [UPL] rules .... [T]he protection [of nonlawy-
ers by UPL rules] is probably unwanted and thus paternalistic in a most objectionable
way.").
97. Id. at 831.
98. Id.
99. See Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, American Bar Ass'n,
Agenda for Access: The American People and Civil Justice 1-2 (1996); Consortium
on Legal Services and the Public, American Bar Ass'n, Two Nationwide Surveys:
1989 Pilot Assessments of the Unmet Legal Needs of the Poor and of the Public Gen-
erally 38 (1989); Barbara A. Curran, The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report
of a National Survey 152-59 (1977).
100. See Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Related Situations, supra note 14, at 78.
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judgment.'0 1 As a result, national organizations with large member-
ship bases, such as the American Association of Retired Persons, have
campaigned to end UPL restrictions because the consumer public is
not being served effectively by lawyers and should have a choice as to
who represents them.1 0 2 Furthermore, when the citizens of Arizona
were given an opportunity to act upon UPL through a referendum,
UPL rules were roundly rejected.1"3 This suggests that the public may
not desire the "protection" that the bar and the courts have instituted
on their behalf.
The principal negative reaction to relaxing UPL rules is that along
with a wider range of prices for legal services will come a "tiered com-
petency system" which will not be in the best interest of the public." 4
This argument fails because such a tiered competency system already
exists, especially between lawyers and self-represented persons, where
101. Curran, supra note 99, at 231 (reporting that 82% of the nonlawyers respond-
ing to a 1974 survey agreed that many things that lawyers do could be done by others
as competently and less expensively).
An analogy to medical services may prove helpful. Today, for instance, a pregnant
woman has several options for delivering her baby: (1) she can give birth at home
with the help of friends and family; (2) she can hire a birth assistant or doula who has
no formal medical training to help her with the birth; (3) she can hire a midwife who
is trained in delivering babies alone; (4) she can hire a nurse-midwife, a nurse special-
izing in delivering babies; or (5) she can hire a obstetrician and give birth in a hospital.
Because all of these options are legal, none constitutes the unauthorized practice of
medicine. Should there be complications with her birth, she can seek the assistance of
a doctor at the hospital. The patient can assess her desire for these services based on
cost, comfort and her beliefs.
In this analogy, the doctor is akin to the lawyer. In the event of a relaxation of the
UPL rules, the client would be faced with a whole range of options based on cost,
comfort, and her beliefs. Similarly, should she face complications with her legal prob-
lem, she can always retain a lawyer.
102. See Morrison, supra note 24, at 367.
103. In 1961, the Supreme Court of Arizona found that title companies and realtors
were engaged in UPL by preparing documents used in the transfer of real estate. See
State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 14 (Ariz. 1961). The follow-
ing November, Arizonans voted on Proposition 103, which would allow realtors and
the like to prepare real estate transfer documents. The measure received 300,000
votes, the highest total votes for a proposition at that time with 172,000 votes in favor.
See M. Marks, The Lawyers and the Realtors: Arizona's Experience, 49 A.B.A. J. 139
(1963).
Another instance of adverse public reaction to UPL arose when the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed the Florida Bar's successful prosecution of Rosemary
Furman who had a business preparing documents for pro se individuals. See Florida
Bar v. Furman, 376 So. 2d 378, 381 (Fla. 1979). Furman defied the court order to
terminate her business and the bar obtained a contempt ruling against her. Florida
Bar v. Furman, 451 So. 2d 808, 815 (Fla. 1984), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 925 (1984).
Public outcry against these rulings was so strong that the Florida Supreme Court
eventually adopted a rule that permits nonlawyers to help prepare certain documents
and give advice on administrative matters. See Rules Regulating Fla. Bar Rule 10-2-1.
104. See Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Related Situations, supra note 14, at 126.
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the gap in competence is at its maximum.105 The minimum level of
competence that lawyers are expected to maintain in order to con-
tinue to practice law does not necessarily mean that nonlawyers are
unable to achieve a similar level of competence. For instance, a study
of nonlawyer practice before an administrative agency shows that a
party who is represented by either a lawvyer or nonlawyer is much
more likely to meet with success in pursuing their case.U(
2. Effective Administration of Justice
The notion that absent UPL rules there can be no effective adminis-
tration of justice seems based on two additional assumptions: (1) cli-
ents would retain incompetent nonlawyers ignorant of the rules of
procedure, evidence, and legal precedent; and (2) nonlawyers would
be more ruthless and less candid than lawyers. These assumptions are
largely untested. With regard to the first assumption, the incompetent
nonlawyer would be liable to his or her client for malpractice, as dis-
cussed above. Such ineffectiveness before the courts would undoubt-
edly besmirch the reputation of that particular nonlawyer and deter
most potential clients from engaging his or her services, but it is con-
ceivable that nonlawyers found liable for malpractice on one occasion
would still be hired again by clients ignorant of their misdeeds. The
same can be said, however, of lawyers who have been found liable for
malpractice and merely sanctioned by the bar. As to the second as-
sumption, courts have inherent and statutory power to impose the
same sanctions against nonlawyer representatives that are currently
imposed upon lawyers for unethical tactics or lack of candor.10 7 Even
in many cases of UPL, courts have simply held nonlawyers to the
same standard of care as lawyers as a way of assessing the nature of
the nonlawyer's conduct.
105. The range of lawyers' fees already reflects a tiered system of competence
based on a particular lawyer's perceived level of competence which will usually com-
mand a higher fee.
106. In 1992, claimants before the Social Security Administration represented by
lawyers obtained 73% favorable decisions while those represented by nonlawyers re-
ceived 71% favorable decisions. See Nonlawvyer Activity in Law-Related Situations,
supra note 14, at 113 n.393. This difference hardly represents a statistically significant
difference from Tier 1 to Tier 2. so to speak. In the same study, however, however,
self-represented persons prevailed only 57% of the time. See i. This disparity in
effectiveness suggests a significantly tiered system of competence between the repre-
sented and unrepresented parties. See William D. Popkin, The Effect of Representa-
tion in Nonadversary Proceedings-A Study of Three Disability Programs, 62 Cornell
L. Rev. 989, 1027 (1977) (finding that represented claimants appearing in Federal Em-
ployees Compensation Act proceedings tend to prevail in more cases than unrepre-
sented claimants).




Another rationale in favor of UPL rules is that such rules create an
effective system for discipline of those who render legal services for
others. Without UPL, the self-regulation and ethical standards of the
legal profession would be hobbled because: (1) the deterrent effects
of the penalties of disbarment and suspension would be removed; and
(2) lawyers would be substantially disadvantaged competitively by
complying with ethical precepts when other practitioners would not be
so constrained in their ability to solicit clients and advertise to the
public. In a legal services market without UPL restrictions, however,
in which clients can choose the services of nonlawyers, professional
lawyers will probably still command the highest fees and enjoy the
best repute of all legal services providers.' Thus, a disbarred or sus-
pended lawyer would not be able to partake in the distinct economic
and social advantages of bar membership.
Furthermore, it is evident that society should insulate lawyers from
competition in order to preserve lawyer codes upon the condition that
"the net social value of such constraints more than offsets the costs
imposed by the resulting lawyers' monopoly."' 1 9 On more than one
occassion, the Supreme Court has found that this condition for pre-
serving lawyer codes has not been met. For example, in Bates v. State
Bar," the Court held that rules prohibiting lawyer advertising consti-
tuted an unconstitutional interference with freedom of speech."'
4. Minimizing Competitive Practices
Without UPL, the fear is that lawyers will behave competitively for
clients like any other business, which will ultimately hurt clients, harm
the legal system, and erode professional discipline. According to Pro-
fessor Russell Pearce, the practice of law has recently undergone a
radical paradigm shift from being construed solely as a profession to
"the widespread perception is that law practice is a business."' 2 Like
the ECs which justify UPL restrictions, "the Professional Paradigm
rests on a purported bargain between the profession and society in
which the profession agreed to act for the good of clients and society
in exchange for autonomy." 3 In support of this paradigm, there ex-
ists a "Business-Profession dichotomy," whereby business, which
seeks to maximize profit, is incompatible with professionalism, which
places the good of clients and society above lawyer self-interest." 4
108. See Pearce, supra note 94, at 1273.
109. See Wolfram, supra note 14, § 15.2.1, at 833.
110. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
111. See id. at 382-83.
112. Pearce, supra note 94, at 1232.




The encroachment of the Business Paradigm onto the Professional
Paradigm may elicit a range of responses from the organized bar-
from maintaining the status quo to deregulating the practice of law to
permit market forces alone to take control. Professor Pearce advo-
cates a "Middle Range" approach between these poles by "allowing
nonlawyers to provide legal services but retaining a role for the organ-
ized bar with bar membership serving as a certificate rather than a
license.""' 5 In contrast to the rationale for UPL rules, Professor
Pearce believes that the Middle Range approach "may very well im-
prove the quality of legal services, the administration of justice, and
the contribution of lawyers to the public good .... [The] increased




The rationale for UPL restrictions raises many questions about the
need for maintaining a lawyer monopoly upon the practice of law. A
1995 report on Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Related Situations recom-
mended that any changes in UPL must be undertaken on a state-by-
state basis. 1 7 However, if the whole system of rationale is suspect to
its core, then national organizations, such as the ABA, should take
action.
Today, there are more lawyers per capita than ever before."' How-
ever, the legal needs of low- and moderate-income persons remain
seriously unmet. As a functional matter, the lawyer monopoly must
be responsible to a large degree for the lack of affordable options that
might otherwise be made available in a more diversified market for
legal services. UPL restrictions appear to be the main barrier block-
ing the development of affordable legal services options for the public.
Thus, UPL laws, rules, and rulings should be eased or undone in order
to make way for greater public access to legal services and, hopefully,
as a result, greater access to justice for all.
115. Id. at 1232.
116. Id. at 1232-33.
117. See Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Related Situations, supra note 14, at 134-42.
118. Cf. Howard Erichson, Strengthening Ethics in a Million-Lawsyer World, Nat'l
LJ., Aug. 3, 1998, at A24 (estimating that following the results of the July 1998 bar
examinations, the total number of lawyers in the United States would surpass one
million).
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